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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WluMA HALL,
CITY CAB co. ' INC' and
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND,

Appellants,

Case No. l.illi

vs.

SECOND INJURY FUND and
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPG~DE~T
SECOND INJURY FUND
This is a case on appeal from the Industrial
Commission ot Ucah affirming the Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order of the Administrative Law Judge.
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Respondent accepts the statement on the "Disposition
by the Industrial Commission" as in the Brief of the Appellant

State Insurance Fund.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Second Injury Fund requests that the final
Order or the Industrial Commission be affirmed by this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the course of employment with City Cab Co. on
Maren 9, 1981, the Appellant Wilma Hall was traveling

northbound on 900 West when her vehicle was hit broadside by
another automobile (R.19).

The impact spun her Cab around,

completely turning her automobile in a southern direction.

At

the time ot the collision, Ms. Hall felt immedite pain to her
head, neck, back and other parts of the body CR.19-21).
Ms. Hall testified that she had never had any
problems with her neck or back before this industrial event
(R.40).

sne stated that prior to her automobile accident the

only parts of her body that caused her problems were her heart
condition (R.34) and a weight problem through the years CR.37l.
Following the incident, Ms. Hall was treated
medically for head injuries and whiplash to the neck and
back.

Such is documented by the Holy Cross Hos?ital records

(R.3) and her testimony at the hearing CR.19-21):

Q.

What dia you experience immediately?

A.

I had pain in my neck ... and my shoulders, I had
a large lump on the left front of my forehead,
and my back felt like one part went one way,
another part went the other way ..•

Q.

Were you taken to a hospital?

A.

Yes, I was •.

Q.

What diu Dr. Romney do?

A.

He examined me ..• then he said the muscles in my
neck were injured and I had a concussion ...

Q.

Were you having any problems at the time you went
home?

A.

I was having pain in my neck, my back and in my
head .•• •
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The early treatment of Ms. Hall does not demonstrate
that she was having aaditional problems with her obesity or
heart conditions.

Subsequently, Appellant Hall filed a claim

for additional benefits.
On April 21, 1983 the Judge entered his Findings of
fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (R.312-319) ruling that Ms.
Hail had received all her benefits for the industrial injury to
her neck and back and that her claim for compensations benefits
for her pre-existing conditions of obesity, heart and
degenerative arthritis was denied (R.3171.

The Judge's ruling

was based upon his finding that the previous conditions did not
make the industrial injuries substantially greater because of
such prior conditions.
On May S, 1983 the employer's carrier filed a Motion
for Review (R. 320-321).

Applicant Hall joined in the carrier's

Motion (R. 322).
On May 24, 1983 the Second Injury Fund filed an
'Answer to Motion for Review" submitting that the Judge had not
acted arbitrary in his ruling (R.324-326) and that the greater
weight of the medical evidence clearly supported the Judge's
final order.
The Industrial Commission of Utah entered it's final
Oraer on June 29, 1983 (R.336) ruling that the Order of the
Judge shall be affirmed.

On August 1, 1983 Appellant Hall

filed a Petition for Writ of Review to determine whether she

3

was entitled to worker's Compensation Benefits based on her
previous obesity, heart and arthritis incapacities.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Appellant Hall is NOT entitled to Worker's
Compensation Benefits for her pre-existing
obesity, heart and arthritis problems because
such previous incapacities did NOT
substantially increase the industrial injury
to her cervical area.
The Industrial Commission acted properly in
affirming the ruling or the Administrative Law Judge that "the
evidence does not support a finding that the industrial
accident resulted in permanent incapacity substantially greater
than the applicant would have incurred if she had not had a
pre-existing incapacity." (R.317l
The controlling statute in providing benefits on the
basis or combined injuries is under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69
If any employee who has previously incurred a
permanent incapacity ... sustains an
industrial injury ..• that results in
permanent incapacity which is substantially
greater than he would have incurred if he had
not had the pre-existing incapacity ..•
(benefits) shall be awarded on the basis of
the combined injuries ...
The aoove statute requires the Commission to make a
finding whether the industrial injury resulted in a
"substantially greater" incapacity because of the pre-existing
conditions betore the combined inquiries can be awarded.
requires a showing from the Appellants that the previous
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This

incapacities had the "effect" of substantially increasing the
industrial impairment.

No such showing was made in this case.

The test for invoking combined benefits under Section
69 was set forth in U.S.F. & G. y, Industrial Commission of
1,,1.Uh, 657 P.2d 764 (Utah 1983).

statutory authority exists to apportion
compensation awards ... between employers and
the Second Injury fund, provided Pertinent
conditions are met. .. (1) (previous)
permanent incapacity occasioned by accidental
injury, disease or congenital causes,
followed by (2) subsequent injury resulting
in further permanent incapacity which is (3)
substantially greater than that which would
have been incurrred had there been no preexisting incapacity ... therefore ... the
Commission is statutorily obligated to
determine whether the subsequent injuries
sustained ... have resulted in further
permanent incapacity which is substantially
greater ...
This Court conclusively resolved the issue of
"substantially greater than" in Day's Market. Inc. y. Muir,
669 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983).

In tlUli, the Commission denied the

worker combined benefits under Section 69 because he had failed
to show that the pre-existing incapacity had the effect of
substantially increasing the industrial impairment.

tlUll

held that the "(Second Injury) Fund's only application is where
the current incapaciaty is substantially greater .•• .t.his_
language reQuires a finding as to the effect the pre-existing
incapacity

has upon the current

<indust riall

incapacity·"

!Emphasis aadedJ.
In the case at bar, the Commission and Judge ruled
that the industrial injury of 10% to her cervical area was not
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"substantially greater" because of the pre-existing problems.
The decision established in essence that Ms. Hall sustained a
10% neck injury from the automobile accident regardless if

sh~

had or dion't have her prior obesity, heart or arthritis
problems.

The 10% injury of the cervical area was caused

by the industrial accident when her cab was hit broadside and
that the previous conditions did

Il.QJ;_

cause, contribute to or

effect the industrial injury of 10%.
Appellant Hall and Appellant carrier erroneously
argue that a mere comparison of numbers is sufficient proof of
"substantially greater."

These abstract mathematical

comparisons that 14% is subtaintially greater than 10% (Brief
of Hall, p.13), or that 28% is substantially greater than 10%
(same Brief, p.12) does not meet the test of proving
substantially greater.

The Appellant insurance carrier commits

the same error by arguing (Brief of State Insurance Fund p.91
that "mere numbers •.• indicate that Ms. Hall's obesity
resulted in a permanent incapacity substantially greater".
This conclusion was needed when the carrier attempted to
compare the ooesity incapacity of 30% with the total combined
impairment ot 52% in concluding that 52% is substantially
greater than 22%.
The error ot both Appellants is illustrated by this
hypothetical example:
injured on the jou.

Mr. X, a paraplegic accountant, is
Mr. X is examined by a medical panel,
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finding that as a result ot the industrial accident Mr.

x

sustained a 10% injury to his 1 ef t hand and because of prior
problems with his legs, he has a previous incapacity of 100%.
It is now illogical for the worker or carrier to combine the
10% industrial injury ot the hand with the total impairment of
100% to conclude that 100% is substantially greater than 10% in

contending that the hand injury is substantially greater
because ot his legs.

The 10% hand injury was caused by the

accidental injury and none of the lOt injury was effected by
the prior leg problems.
Regardless ot the inaccuracy of such comparisons,
the Appellant carrier makes this exact argument when it
combined the 10% industrial injury of the cervical area with
the total impairment of 52% to conclude:
" ... it is oovious that the disability
suffered by Ms. Hall due to the industrial
injury is greater because of her pre-existing
conditions. Certainly, 52% is substantially
greater than 10%." (Brief of State Insurance
Fund, p.16 and p.9l.
Such mathematical comparisons tend to confuse the
Court and distort the issue of "substantially greater."
reasoning or the Appellants is contrary to

Da~'s

The

Market. Inc.

y, Muir, ~. that "Findings in the abstract as to the

total of pre-existing ooesity, heart and arthritis ratings with
the industrial neck injury to make a finding of subtstantially
greater is entering "Findings in the Abstract" to reach a wrong
conclusion.
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A more logical comparison would be to state that
prior to the accident Ms. Hall had a total combined impairment
ot 47% and that after the accident she had a 52%.

Thus, her

impairment rating increased from 47% to 52%.
The method with much more validity is to first
examine what effect the industrial accident had upon the
worker's cervical area to ascertain what portion of the
impairment is attributable to the accident.

Secondly,

determine what effect, if any, the previous obesity, heart and
arthritis conditions had upon the industrial neck injury which
might have substantially increased the industrial impairment.
In the instant case, the evidence shows that Ms. Hall
first experienced problems with her neck immediately after the
accident CR.233, 19-21).

Before the accident, this worker did

not have pre-existing problems in the cervical area (R.300, 3940) and never lost time from work because of neck or back
problems CR. 29, 300).

the record further indicates that she

never had any medical care or x-rays for neck or back
difficulties prior to the accident CR. 29,35).

Even the

Appellant's brief does not describe prior problems with her
neck or
injury:

ba~k

whatsoever until she sustained the accidental

• ••• In spite of her weight problem, she was
remarkably active -- working regularly,
bowling in three leagues, hunting, fishing
and doing her own shopping and housekeeping.
CR.27). Al~hough the medical panel gave her
20% permanent partial pre-existing impairment
for her degenerative arthritis of the entire
spine, she had no problems with pain in her
neck or back prior to the accident ••• • (Brief
Of Hall, P.2)

B

~uch evidence clearly establishes that the 10% neck

injury was caused by the industrial accident and the 10%
injury was not affected by her pre-existing conditions.
The Judge acted correctly in asking the Medical panel
to address the issue ot substantially greater.

In the Medical

panel report, Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook answered the Judge's
question (R. 296-.l04).
"(6) The industrial accident did not result
in permanent incapacity substantially greater
than the apolicant would have incurred had
she not had the pre-existing capacity ... "
With regard to what effect the obesity problem may
have had on the neck injury, Dr. Alan P. Macfarlane, a panel
member, stated (R. 285):
"My conclusions have to be that her obesity
is not due to inactivity imposed by the
accident and the neck and back pain claims,
but rather due to overindulgence in caloric
intaKe •.. there is no essential finding of
unavoidable obesity since the day of the
accident. .. "
The doctor also examined the effects of the prior
heart condition (R. 285):
•rn regard to the heart diseases, though
there is no objective evidence of heart
desease and on none of her several
hospitalizations for chest pain has a
myocardial infarction occured ... I .
.
nevertheless will honor Dr. Null's d1agnos1s
of coronary heart disease ..• but it is
important to note from Dr. Null's record that
he had not seen her between September 1981
and October 1982 which I would have expected
to have occured if her pain was really
significantly worse. When he did see her in
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October 1982, electrocardiagram remained
normal and unchanged. Therefore, I see no
reason to consider that her heart disease is
worse ••. •
Dr. Macfarlane answered the Judge's question on
substantially greater as follows CR.285):
"In particular question 6, seems to me should
be answered in the negative in light of my
reasoning concerning her obesity and coronary
heart symptoms .•. •
Concerning the prior arthritis in the back and its
effect on the industrial neck injury of 10%, Dr. Holbrooke
states CR.300-J04):
"There is pain from the base of her skull all
the way down her spine to the tailbone.
This started six or seven months after the
accident ••. It is possible that had she not
had degenerative cervical arthritis of her
spine the symptoms in her neck at the time of
the accident would have been considerably
less .•• but is speculatiye."
(Emphasis
added)
The greater weight of the medical and factual
evidence supports the Judge's conclusion that prior conditions
did not make the industrial injury substantially greater.

Dr.

F. Clyde Null's medical report of November 14, 1981 supports
the theory that the history of obesity and heart problems have
not cnangea her condition over the years CR.80).

The St. Marks

Hospital records substantiate that Ms. Hall has never been able
to control her weight and has a longstanding history of anginal
syndrome CR.160-161).

Dr. M. Romney of the Holy Cross Hospital

states:
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"This ...• lady was involved in a motor
vehicle accident on March 9, 1981. She
states that immediately after the accident
she had the onset of her neck pain ...
Based upon the findings of the Medical Panel and all
the records in this case, the Industrial Commission of Utah
properly affirmed the ruling of the Judge

~hat

the claim for

combined benefits for obesity, heart or arthritis pre-existing
conditions should be denied because the previous incapacities
did nQ.i effect or make the industrial cervical injury
'substantialy greater" than it would have been "but for" the
pre-existing incapacities.

Day's Market, Inc. y. Muir,

supra.
POINT II
Appellant Carrier is not entitled to a 90%
reimbursement of temporary disability or
medical benefit paid for the industrial
injury because the pre-existing obesity,
heart and arthritis conditions did not
contribute or effect the need for such
benefits.
This point is an important issue that is causing
many appeals to this court.

The problem of reimbursement has

been a primary cause of the increase in litigation at the
Commission and appeals to the Supreme Court.

Insurance

carriers have been denying full payment of temporary total
disability and medical benefits because of pre-existing
conditions, which may or may not be effecting the accidental
injury.

Often the issue is not whether these benefits should

be paid but wno snould pay for them.
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Larson in his workmen's Compensation at
59.32(g) says:
Neccessity that second injury add to
prior disability
"Although the prior
impairment need not combine with the
compensable injury in any special way, it
must add something to the disability before
the special fund can become liable. In other
words, it is not enough to show that claimant
had some kind of handicap, if that handicap
contributed nothing to the final disabilty.
For example, pre-existing partial loss of
hearing was not a basis for shifting part of
compensation liability to the Special Fund
when the ultimate disabiliity took the form
of silicosis or an injured hand."
This rule applies in this case and would preclude an
apportionment ot benefits between the State Insurance Fund and
the Second Injury Fund when the prior conditions are unrelated
and in no way contribute to the problems being treated.

The

State Insurance Fund, however, reasons that it should be
reimbursed at 42/52 or 90% of all such benefits paid based
the findings that Ms. Hall had prior incapacities.

on

This

carrier combines all the unrelated previous incapacitites of
30% obesity, 5% heart and 20% arthritis on the combined values
chart to find that the total pre-existing condition equals 47%,
then the carrier erroneously argues that since Ms. Hall had a
total impairment of 52% after the accident from all causes and
conditions, the Second Injury Fund is liable for 47/52 or 90%
of temporary disability and medical benefits and the State
Insurance Fund is liable for 5/52 or 10%.
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The statutory language of The Act does not support
such a contention where the need of the benefits was caused by
the industrial injury.

§35-1-50 requires that the carrier

state Insurance Fund shall pay for compensation and medical
services for injuries arising out of the course of employment.
\35-1-45 provides that every worker inJured on the job shall be

entitled to compensation and medical treatment from the
carrier for said industrial injuries.
It was never the intent of the Act to require the
second Injury Fund to pay for medical costs and temporary
disability solely necessitated by an industrial accident.
Section 35-l-b9 provides that the liab1l1ty of the employer's
carrier shall be for the industrial injury and that portion
made substantially greater by prior incapacities shall be the
liabilty of the Second Injury Fund.

If as in this case, the

previous incapacities consists of obesity, heart and arthritis
and the industrial injury is to the cervical area, such
benefits should nQ.t be apportioned because of obesity, heart
and arthritis problems.

The remibursement of benefits based on

overweight, heart and arthritis becomes an adjudicative
nightmare in deciding who should pay for what, thereby causing
a tremendous increase in litigation.
This Court ruled that "if the requirement of the
ttatute is met, that is, if the resulting permanent incapacity
is substantially greater than if the permanent incapacity had
not existed, proportional causation must be found."
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Intermountain Health Care Inc. v. Ortega, 562 P.2d 617 (Utah
19771,

Consequently, if it is reasonable for the Law Judge t0

conclude from all the evidence that the worker did

~

sustain an industrial incapacity which is substantially
greater, there is no apportionment and no application of the
Second Injury Fund.

Kincheloe y, Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,

656 P.2d 440 (Utah 1982>.

Intermountaio Health Care held

that the requirement that the pre-existing combines with the
later industrial injury to cause a substantially greater means
that the increase caused by the prior conditions must be some
definite and measurable portion of the causation.

Such was not

the case with Ms. Hall who had no prior problems with her
cervical neck area before the accident and who had all her neck
and back problems caused by the industrial accident.
Therefore, the party CCity Cab and State Insurance Fund) who
created the problem should pay for it.
The Respondent Secondary Injury Fund prays that
temporary disbaility and medical benefits

should~

be

reimbursed at 90% where the previous conditions did not
contribute to the lost time from work or need for medical care.
That the employer's carrier, State Insurance Fund, is the sole
responsible party to pay for such benefits arising out of the
course or employement.
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POINT III
An overweight condition or obesity does not
constitute a permanent inr~pacity, or
disability under the Worker's Comµensation
Act.
Obesity is not a pernidnent disability covered under
§JS-1-06 or a permanent incapacity under )35-1-69 of the Utah
code Annotated, 1953.

The applicant has a long history of

overweight problems; however, the medical doctors recommend
that a proper diet and exercise prrJqram can significantly

improve this condition.
In Larsen's "Workmen's Compensation" he emphasizes:
Necessity that prior 1mgairmenL be permanent
in character.
"Often by express statutory
language, and sometimes by decisional law,
the Second Injury Fund is held to apply only
when the prior inJury is permanent in
charater." 59.32(hl
And in Utah the law

clearl~-

existing incaoac1ty be permanent.

requires that the pre-

35-1-69 UCA.

In Shirley y. Triangle Maintenance Corg., 41 A.D.
2nd 800, 341 NYS 2nd 709 obesitv was held not to be a permanent
prior

di~ability

fur whicn the Second Injury Fund would be held

responsible.
POINT IV
The Order of the Industrial Commission shall
be affirmed when supported by substantial
evidence.
The Order of the Industrial Commission must be
confirmed when supported by substantial evidence and reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom.
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As stated in Kaiser Steel Corp. y. Monfredi, 631
P.2d 888 (Utah 1981), and reaffirmed in Kincheloe y. Coca-Col2
Bottling Co., 656 P.2d 440 (Utah 1982), the scope of review

nt

Industrial Commission cases is limited to:
Whether the Commission's findings are
"arbitrary or capricous," or "wholly without
cause" or contrary to the one [inevitable]
conclusion from the evidence or without any
substantial evidence to support them. Only
then should the Commission's findings be
displaced.
CONCLUSION
The Order of the Industrial Commission and Judge
denying worker's Compensation benefits for obesity, heart and
arthritis problems and denying .remibursement from the Second
Injury Fund should be affirmed.

Reimbursement and Compensation

should not be awarded for obesity, heart and arthritis <or any
other previous incapacity) unless it can be found that the
current industrial injury of the cervical area is substantially
greater than it would have been "but for" such pre-existing
incapacities.

Day's Market, supra.

In the instant case, the

Commission found that the permanent incapacity attributable to
Ms. Hail's injury was nQt. made

substanti~y

greater.

Respectfully submitted this~ day of February,
1984.

Frank V. Neisen
Assistant Attorney General
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